Humanities and Arts

Non-maximality and vagueness: Revisiting the plural Sorites paradox


  Peer Reviewed

Abstract

This paper is an attempt at a synthesis of two superficially conflicting approaches to non-maximality: the issue-based approach (Malamud 2012, Križ 2015, Križ & Spector 2021 a.o.), which generates clear-cut truth conditions once the issue parameter has been fixed, and the strict/tolerant approach (Burnett 2017 a.o.), on which non-maximal construals involve vagueness. I argue that there are two classes of contexts that license non-maximality. One of them gives rise to the Sorites paradox once the non-embeddability of non-maximality is controlled for. The other class does not license vagueness at all. To model this distinction, I introduce a formal framework that combines the issue-based approach with the notion of strict and tolerant truth conditions (Cobreros, Egré, Ripley & van Rooij 2012a), which are defined via super-/subvaluation over different issues. This system provides two sources of non-maximality, only one of which involves vagueness.

Key Questions about Non-Maximality, Vagueness, and the Plural Sorites Paradox

What is the Sorites paradox, and how does it relate to non-maximality?

The Sorites paradox, also known as the paradox of the heap, arises from the problem of vague predicates and the challenge of determining when a collection of small changes results in a significant change. In the context of non-maximality, the paradox highlights how vague predicates can lead to borderline cases where it's indeterminate whether a collection meets a certain threshold.

How does Haslinger's framework address the Sorites paradox?

Haslinger's framework distinguishes between two classes of contexts that license non-maximality. One class gives rise to the Sorites paradox once the non-embeddability of non-maximality is controlled for, while the other does not license vagueness at all. By combining the issue-based approach with the notion of strict and tolerant truth conditions, her system provides a nuanced understanding of how non-maximality interacts with vagueness in plural constructions.

What are the implications of this framework for understanding vagueness in language?

This framework offers a more refined analysis of vagueness in language by distinguishing between contexts that involve vagueness and those that do not. It suggests that vagueness arises in specific contexts where non-maximality leads to borderline cases, while in other contexts, non-maximality does not involve vagueness. This distinction enhances our understanding of how vagueness operates in natural language semantics.

By addressing these questions, the article contributes to a deeper understanding of the semantics of plural constructions and the role of vagueness in language, offering a solution that aligns with recent empirical findings in the field.